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FOREWORD 
This reliability assessment  report  presents  the resul t  of an  inter-  
disciplinary team effort that commenced in  February of 1965. Although 
assessment  studies on the GEOS A spacecraft have been completed a s  
of the date of this report  (29 December 1965), studies of GEOS A in-orbit 
performance are  planned for 1966. Assessment studies associated with 
the GEOS B spacecraft  design a r e  underway and a r e  expected to continue 
into 1966. 
Electronic subsystem analyses were ca r r i ed  out by W. C. Graham, 
D. B. Levinson, M. D. Reed, and H. G. Thompson. Mechanical subsystem 
analyses were  ca r r i ed  out by J. A. Kolkin, R. J. Mulvihill, and L. H. 
Simonsen. Reliability models were  prepared by C. E. Bloomquist, with 
assis tance from L. Roseman and C. H. Wilmot. Performance analyses 
of the attitude control and stabilization subsystem were  ca r r i ed  out by 
C. H. Wilmot. R. J. Mulvihill se rved  as  project manager for this study. 
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ABSTRACT 
This report  provides a summary ofthe GEOS A subsystem reli-  
ability assessments  as well a s  the overall  sys tem assessment.  In ad- 
dition a reliability improvement study on the GEOS A clock and memory 
subsystem is discussed. 
Assuming that the Doppler and transponder experiments have a 
reliability of one, the effectiveness figure-of-merit for  the GEOS A 
spacecraft  l ies  between 0.41 and 0 . 6 3 .  The lower limit corresponds 
to a zero valuefor the alternate optical logic, and the upper limit cor-  
responds to a value of the alternate optical logic equal to the value of 
the memory controlled logic. 
It is recommended that certain studies associatedwith command 
and telemetry channel assignments, complete review of the par t s  pro- 
gram, and improvement of the clock and memory design be car r ied  
out. A modification to the design of the optical beacon is a lso 
r e  commended. 
Q k a a  
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L INTRODUCTION 
Reliability assessment  studies commenced during February of 1965. 
In keeping with the imminence of the GEOS A design freeze,  Planning Re- 
sea rch  Corporation (PRC) concentrated its efforts on identifying and advising 
on design improvements in  the a reas  which were found o r  expected to be 
critical. 
according to their  criticality: 
Critical a r e a s  were grouped as indicated below and then ordered 
0 Design a r e a s  (usually subsystems o r  par ts  thereof) where de- 
cisions relative to reliability had to be made pr ior  to the 
GEOS A design freeze 
Design a r e a s  which were identified from reviews by NASA 
Headquarters, NASA Goddard, Applied Physics Laboratory, o r  
PRC a s  potential a r e a s  for reliability improvement 
0 
0 Design a reas  which, during the reliability modeling of subsys- 
terns, appeared a s  potential a reas  for reliability improvement 
As a result ,  the following spacecraft subsystems were studied, w i t h  
emphasis generally in accordance with their order :  
0 Clock/memory/alternate optical logic, w i t h  special emphasis 
on de sirability of retaining the alternate optical logic 
0 Command sub system 
0 Power supply subsystem 
0 Thermal  control 
0 Gravity gradient stabilization 
0 
During the course of the GEOS A study, a contract amendment was 
Telemetry sub s y  s tern 
issued which provided that additional studies be made on the reliability of 
the optical beacon experiment and the Douglas yo-yo de-spin device, a s  
well as  conduct special studies on the clock and memory. 
In addition to the above studies car r ied  out under the general cate- 
gory of spacecraft  reliability assessment studies, a study was undertaken 
on the operational reliability of the GEOS A spacecraft. The results of 
this study generally have been in  the form of diagnostic routines for the 
PRC R-760 
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I 
analysis of in-flight spacecraft failures, a s  well a s  decision-action 
charts  related to these same spacecraft failures. 
This report  is a summary report. Most of the details of the in- 
dividual subsystem reliability assessments,  as well a s  the operational 
reliability assessments ,  a r e  found in technical advisement memoranda 
which shall be referred to throughout this report .  
presents  the resul ts  of analyses not previously reported in technical 
advisement memoranda. 
liability improvement study on the clock and memory subsystem, a s  
well  a s  the par ts  program study for the clock and memory subsystem. 
In addition, an overall  reliability model for the GEOS A spacecraft i s  
reported f o r  the f i r s t  time in  this report. 
resu l t s  from the detailed subsystem reliability assessment  studies re -  
This report  also 
Typical of such resul ts  a r e  those of the r e -  
This overall  model combines 
ported previously in technical advisement memoranda. 
PRC R-760 
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11. SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
t 
A. GEOS A Command Subsystem 
An effectiveness figure-of-merit (F. 0. M. ) reliability model was 
developed for this subsystem. 
states considered in the model was related approximately to  the expected 
fraction of the total number of the 64 commands which were usable given 
a degraded state. 
complete discussion of the analysis a s  well as the results a r e  presented 
in Reference 1. 
The value assigned to  each of the degraded 
The overall F. O.M. derived was equal to 0.771. A 
Two modifications to the design were set  up and exercised in the 
model. These modifications, which were  concerned with the failure ef- 
fec ts  that cause the loss  of the entire command subsystem, were (1) 
making the ground line to  the matrix SCR's switchable, and (2)  AC- 
coupling the dr ivers  in the logic units to  the SCR's in the matrix. 
corresponding F. 0. M. model reliability numerics were found to  be 
0.807 and 0.777 respectively for these modifications. 
The 
It was concluded by PRC that in general the design and implemen- 
tation of the GEOS A command subsystem was very good. Although the 
two modifications exercised in the model showed an increase in the r e -  
liability, with modification 1 showing the greater increase,  it was felt  
that the increase was not large enough to warrant  a firm recommenda- 
tics fsr the acceptance of either. On the other hand, the increase shown 
by modification 1 i s  not so insignificant that it can be ignored. It was 
also concluded that the overall reliability could not be increased much 
beyond that illustrated f rom modification 1 by further efforts toward r e -  
ducing the probability of occurrence of loss of the entire subsystem. 
PRC feels very strongly that the assignment of locations of com- 
mands in any matrix should be optimized with respect to reliability. 
This particular a r e a  will be investigated in a future study. 
t 
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B. Contribution of the Alternate Optical Logic to the Reliability 
of the GKOS A Optical Beacon ETectronics 
A full discussion of this analysis, together with the resul ts  of the 
analysis, i s  presented in Reference 2. The optical beacon electronics 
consists of the clock and memory subsystem of the GEOS A spacecraft. 
The pr imary purpose of this subsystem i s  to provide inputs to the se- 
quence controller of the optical beacon. 
(AOL) i s  a backup system to the memory and provides for the issuance 
of signals to the sequence controller upon ground command. 
The alternate optical logic 
A reliability model was prepared for this subsystem. The ap- 
proach taken in the assessment  was to assume that the whole subsystem 
was a 2-state device. 
a resul t  of the failure mode and effect analysis. A maximum and mini- 
mum reliability were calculated, which bound the t rue reliability based 
on the 2-state device assumption. 
assuming that a l l  par t s  which cause a par t ia l  loss  of function cause no 
loss  a t  a l l  (i. e., that they do not exist). 
assuming that a l l  par t s  that cause a partial  loss  cause complete loss. 
The maximum and minimum values of the reliability a r e  given below. 
In actuality, 24 degraded states were found a s  
The upper bound i s  derived by 
The lower bound is derived by 
- 
R(t)  = 0.130 + 0.798V 
R(t)  = 0.081 + 0.838V -
where V = the relative value of the optical beacon electronics when 
using the AOL, as  compared with the value when the sys- 
tem functions normally with a completely functional 
memory 
If the AOL i s  completely removed, the corresponding values fo r  the 
maximum and minimum bounds on the true reliability a r e  0.131 and 
0.085 respectively. 
"without AOL" system predictions, the value of the AOL, under the 
assumptions used, would have to be l e s s  than 1 percent to justify its 
removal. It was concluded that, f rom a reliability viewpoint, i t  was 
strongly advisable on the basis  of the assessment  to retain the a l te r -  
nate optical logic. 
It i s  c lear  that, by comparing the "with AOL" and 
I 
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C. Power Supply Subsystem 
References 3 and 9 present in detail the analyses and results of 
these analyses which were performed on the power supply subsystem, 
Reference 3 presents the detailed observations made on seven aspects 
of the design of this subsystem. Reference 9 presents the details of a 
reliability assessment ,  provides the probability of obtaining any of the 
required outputs of this subsystem, either individually o r  in combination 
with each other, and provides an overall effectiveness F. 0. M. for this 
subsystem. 
based on assigning the following relative values to each of the active 
GEOS A experiments. 
The value system utilized in the F. 0. M. calculations is 
Experiment 
Optical beacon 
Doppler 
SECOR t rans  ponder 
Relative Normalized 
5 5/12 
4 4/12 
2 2/12 
Value Relative Value 
Range and Range Rate  transponder 1 1/12 
The numerical value fo r  the F. 0. M. was found to be equal to  0.935, 
which means that a t  the end of one year the power supply is expected 
to perform 93.5 percent of the function demanded of it. 
D. Assessment of Thermal Design of the GEOS A Spacecraft 
This analysis covered the steady-state performance of the GEOS A 
passive thermal  control subsystem. However, comments relative to the 
transient performance were a l s o  made. The analysis of the steady- 
state performance was  carr ied out by constructing a thermal analog 
model of the spacecraft  and computing therefrom the steady-state tem- 
peratures  for  the worst-case orbit condition. A complete discussion of 
this analysis, together with the results,  is presented in Reference 4. 
It was concluded that the best design f rom the standpoints of both 
transient and steady-state heat transfer involved the use of insulation 
1. PRC R-760 
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of the external panels with respect to the internal box coupled with lim- 
ited conduction. 
sections was necessary. In addition, it was concluded that external 
conduction among the external panels was necessary. Provided the 
above recommendations for  conduction paths a r e  properly implemented, 
and using accepted values for the thermal resistance of the insulation to  
be used on GEOS A, together with approximate thicknesses to be utilized, 
it w a s  concluded that the passive GEOS A thermal control subsystem is 
capable of maintaining the spacecraft temperatures a t  suitable values. 
The reliability of the thermal  control subsystem is therefore directly r e -  
lated to the reliability of maintaining the conduction paths mentioned 
above. 
e r t ies  of fiber glass buttons, which insulate the external panels f rom the 
t r u s s  sections, and by panel conduction bands (clips), which provide paths 
among the external panels. Further investigations should be carr ied out 
to determine the reliability of these fiber glass buttons and panel conduc- 
tion bands. 
That is, some radial conduction through the 8 t ru s s  
These conduction paths a re  to be controlled by the conducting prop- 
E. Analysis of Gravity Gradient Stabilization Subsystem Performance 
Reference 5 provides the details of this analysis. The analysis 
was based on a gravity gradient stabilization system consisting of the 
N R L  60-foot boom and the General Electric eddy current  damper, which 
is mounted at the end of the boom. 
f r o m  this analysis are:  
The important conclusions drawn 
1. F o r  all practical purposes, pitch vibratioiis a r e  daxpec! 
out within 1 day after capture. 
2. For  all practical purposes, yaw rotations a r e  damped out 
in 1 o r  2 orbital periods. 
In the event of upside-down capture of the spacecraft, an 
inversion maneuver can be accomplished by retracting the 
boom to 30-foot extension and then extending the boom 
after several  minutes. 
3.  
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F. Reliability Analysis of De-Spinning Capability of GEOS A With 
Special Xmphasis on the YO-YO De-Spin Device _ _  
This analysis was undertaken to  provide a basis for a decision as  
to whether o r  not it was desirable to incorporate magnetic hysteresis de-  
spin rods in the GEOS A spacecraft. It was recognized that a significant 
weight penalty must be paid if these rods a r e  installed. 
presents a detailed analysis of this problem. 
F. 0. M. model is developed in Reference 7, which represents the de- 
spinning actions involved, namely, (1) re lease of the yo-yo de-spin weights, 
(2)  extension of the boom (this generally increases the moment of in- 
e r t i a  about the spin axis), and ( 3 )  damping action of the General Electric 
(G. E.) eddy current  damper.  
rods a r e  utilized, the spin rate  is damped out exponentially. 
liability of the yo-yo de-spin device was found to be equal to 0.997. 
is equal to the F. 0. M. when no credit is taken for any of the other 
de -spinning actions. 
Reference 7 
An overall effectiveness 
In addition, i f  the magnetic hysteresis 
The r e -  
It 
Thus the conclusion was reached that there appears to be no strong 
requirement for the magnetic hysteresis de-spin rods. In the event 
that magnetic hysteresis  rods a r e  used, they do provide an adequate 
back-up in the unlikely event of failure of the yo-yo de-spin device. 
was not possible to determine whether the extension of the boom and 
the damping action of the G. E. damper would provide an adequate back- 
up, since the results of the G.E. dynamics analysis were not complete 
at the time this study was performed. 
consideration in a follow-on effort. However, since the reiiabiliti; of 
the yo-yo de-spin device by itself is so high, the inclusion of the effect 
of the boom and damper will not change the overall de-spinning F. 0. M. 
significantly. 
It 
It is intended to include this 
It will remain at approximately 0.997. 
G. Optical Beacon Reliability Assessment 
The reliability of the GEOS A optical beacon experiment depends 
on the reliabilities of (1) the optical beacon power supply, (2)  the com- 
mand subsystem, (3 )  the clock and memory subsystem, and (4) the 
PRC R-760 
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optical beacon. Results of reliability assessments  on the first three of 
these subsystems a r e  reported upon above and a r e  given in  References 
9, 1, and 2 ,  respectively. 
Reference 8 deals with the reliability assessment  of the fourth i tem, 
In addition, this reference provides a n  that is, the optical beacon itself. 
overall  model wherein the overall  reliability, that is, the probability of ob- 
taining the normal function of the optical beacon experiment a t  the end of 
1 year ,  is computed. In Reference 8 the effectiveness F.O.M. model f o r  
the optical beacon was exercised f o r  the present design configuration and 
for  three design modifications. These modifications were (1) removal of 
one relay from each pair  of power relays in each flash assembly, (2) addi- 
tion of two more power relays to each flash assembly, with contacts in 
s e r i e s  redundancy with present relay contacts, and (3)  increased redun- 
dancy in  the sequence controller. 
ness F. 0. M. model was based on the relative value of the illumination to 
each of the principal types of cameras to be used given each of the model 
states.  The numerical resul t  for  the present design of the optical beacon 
i s  a s  follows: F. 0. M. (maximum): 0.91 1, F. 0. M. (minimum): 0.843. 
The numerical results of exercising the model for  the three design modi- 
fications a r e  a s  follows: 
The value system used in this effective- 
a Modification 1, maximum: 0.922; minimum: 0.854 
a Modification 2, maximum: 0.939; minimum: 0.87 0 
Modification 3, maximum: 0.948; minimum: 0.946 
The 1-year F. 0. M. ' s  for each of the four subsystems associated 
with the optical beacon experiment a r e  as foiiows: 
power 0.91 
command 0.77 
clock and memory 0.081 t 0.838V 
where V = the relative value of the alternate optical logic a s  defined 
above 
optical beacon 0. 84 
P R C  R-760 
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The clock and memory and optical beacon F. 0. M. ' s  represent  the 
minimum values for  their predicted range. 
F. 0. M. is obtained by the product of the above F. 0. M. Is. 
mated 1 -year  F. 0. M. fo r  the optical beacon experiment is 0.048 t 0.47V. 
This F. 0. M. can only be considered high if  the relative value of the al- 
ternate optical logic V is considered to be high. 
is controlled pr imari ly  by the F. 0. M. value of the clock and memory, 
which again is not high unless the relative value of the alternate optical 
logic is considered to be high. 
An estimate of the overall 
The est i -  
The value of the F. 0. M. 
F r o m  the standpoint of reliability, the present  design of the EG&G 
optical beacon appears very good. Para l le l  redundancy is used in many 
pa r t s  of the design. Modification 3,  which incorporates increased r e -  
dundancy within the sequence controller, resulted in a significant increase 
in the minimum value of the optical beacon F. 0. M. Considering the whole 
optical beacon experiment, i t  was found that the command subsystem, 
optical beacon power supply, and the optical beacon have a high probabil- 
ity of performing their functions for 1 year. The clock and memory sub- 
system, however, has a comparatively low 1 -year reliability, unless the 
value of the alternate optical logic mode is considered to be almost equal 
to that of the memory  mode. 
memory  subsystem without the alternate optical logic might be improved 
(raised).  This possibility was investigated, as discussed in Section IV. 
Of course, the reliability of the clock and 
H. GEOS A Telemetrv Subsvstem Reliabilitv Assessment 
R-eference 1 1  presents a detailed assessment  of the telemetry sub- 
sys tem reliability, together with the results of this analysis. 
tiveness F. 0. M. model was constructed for this subsystem. 
sys tem used was based on assigning equal value to each of the commu- 
tated data channels. The resultant F. 0. M. was found to be equal to 0.54 
(indicating roughly that the subsystem is expected to be 54 percent avail- 
able a t  the end of 1 year). It should be pointed out that the pr imary value 
of the GEOS A spacecraft  is associated with its experiments and that none 
of the experiments utilizes the telemetry system to transmit the experi- 
mental  data. 
An effec- 
The value 
The telemetry subsystem accumulates value indirectly in 
I 
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the following way. The telemetry subsystem provides a means of indi- 
cating the status of the spacecraft. An exact knowledge of the status of 
the spacecraft  is useful in providing for better utilization of the experi- 
ments.  It is intended in the future to pursue the study of the indirect 
value of the individual telemetry points to the mission and to optimize 
the assignments of these telemetry points to the individual commutators, 
subcommutators, and telltale registers.  With regard to the calculated 
F. 0. M. indicated above, i t  must be concluded that i t  is highly probable 
that the telemetry subsystem will be in  a degraded state a t  the end of 1 
year.  
subsystem will resul t  in any appreciable loss in value accruing to the 
experiments . 
Howe.ver, i t  is not likely that this degraded state of the telemetry 
I 
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III. OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE 
GEOS A SPACECRAFT 
Reference 10 provides a detailed assessment  of the operational 
reliability of the GEOS A spacecraft. 
analysis of in-orbit spacecraft  failures together with recommended 
actions. 
been prepared which require two sources of spacecraft information: 
telemetry data and data f rom experiments. 
it was not assumed that the telemetry indication is always correct .  
This assessment  consists of an  
Fai lure  diagnostic routines and decision-action charts have 
In the conduct of the analysis, 
An application of decision theory to decisions involving the r e -  
dundant command converter was carr ied out to determine the effect of 
failure of a single telemetry channel on the decision-action procedures. 
It was demonstrated that i f  corroborating evidence based on data from 
other nonfailed telemetry channels is utilized, then no significant 
uncertainty remains with respect to decision making; thus the problem 
of obtaining incorrect  telemetry data on a single channel and therefore 
taking a wrong action was found to  be inconsequential i f  corroborating 
evidence from other telemetry channels is utilized, 
routines and decision-action charts presented in Reference 10 reflect 
the philo sophy of s e eking corroborative evidence. 
The diagnostic 
The application of decision theory to GEOS operational reliability 
in the grosser  situation where there is substantial loss of telemetry and 
concomitant increase in uncertainty is expected to result  in situations 
where the best decision can yield results which a r e  not made intuitively. 
This application i s  presently under consideration. 
I 
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IV. RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT STUDY 
- CLOCK AND MEMORY SUBSYSTEM 
This study consisted of two primary tasks:  (1) an  analysis of the 
clock and memory subsystem with a view toward modifying the design in 
such a way a s  to improve its reliability, and ( 2 )  a review of the Applied 
Physics Laboratory par t s  program for the par ts  used in the clock and 
memory subsystem. 
whether improvements could be made in the par t s  program, which could 
significantly improve the reliability of the clock and memory subsystem, 
and to determine through review of the parts program the most realist ic 
par t  failure ra tes  to be  employed in reliability assessments  of the clock 
and memory. 
The objectives of the la t ter  task  were to establish 
A. Reliability Improvement Study of the GEOS A Clock and Memory 
Subsystem Design 
1. Circuit  Analysis - Memory Core Circuits 
A cursory  analysis of the memory circuits associated with 
the memory cores  was made. Exhibits 1, 2,  and 3 present the reliability 
block diagrams for the clock and memory. 
a r e  shown in block 7 of Exhibit 3, included the 5 by 13 coincidence switch, 
the 3 by 7 coincidence switch, the sense amplifier, the timing and rese t  
circuit ,  and the inhibit stabilizer circuits. 
out a special circuit  analysis for the memory control unit since the imple- 
mentation of the memory control logic is  perforrr-ed primarily by inte- 
grated circuits. The use of integrated circuits for this application has 
been found to be  in accordance with good design practice. 
The memory circuits, which 
It was not necessary to c a r r y  
The object of the analysis of the memory core circuits was to de- 
te rmine  i f  the present memory could be made more  reliable by either 
reducing the total number of parts o r  by making design modifications. 
No attempt was made in this initial effort to justify the operational func- 
tion of the memory  and its associated equipment. 
As a result  of this analysis, it was concluded that the 5 by 13 and 3 
by 7 coincidence switches and the sense amplifier a r e  designed with the 
minimal number of parts to  meet the operational functions required of the 
I 
9 -  
I ! !  
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circuits. Other circuits of the memory, such a s  the inhibit stabil izers,  
the delay circuits,  and the r e se t  drives, were not fully documented. It 
therefore was not possible to conclude with certainty that these circuits 
were designed optimally f rom the standpoint of par ts  minimization. 
an  overall point of view and f rom an operational standpoint, the memory 
unit and its associated electronics appear to be designed with the minimal 
number of par ts  for the present functional design. It was therefore con- 
cluded at this point that a fruitful area of investigation was the functional 
design itself. 
F r o m  
2. Review of Functional Design of the GEOS A Clock and Memory 
An investigation w a s  then car r ied  out to determine whether a 
better functional design for the GEOS A clock and memory subsystem 
could be found within the framework of the functional requirements placed 
on the memory. These 
f rom the capabilities of 
a r e :  
0 As many as  
injection. 
functional requirements, which may be inferred 
the present design as presented in Reference 13, 
59 flash sequences a r e  required for each memory 
0 A t ime period of as  long as 68 hours may elapse between 
memory injections. 
An option of five o r  seven flashes per flash sequence is pro- 
vided. 
Any combination of four flash tubes is selectable indepen- 
dentiy for each flash sequence. 
Continuous correction of memory clock frequency must be 
made in  order  t o  approach synchronism of flash sequences with 
Universal Time. 
The capability of generating a flash sequence during any UT 
minute between memory injections is required. 
The number of possible sequences of 59 flash t imes in 1440 minutes of 
nighttime operation is 
0 
0 
0 
0 
144 O! 235 1 
= 591 1381! 
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With ideal nonredundant coding, which is practically unattainable, about 
351 flash t ime bits would have to be stored in the memory to  specify 59 
flash t imes for each injection. 
In the present memory functional design, there  a r e  59 flash time 
words - one word per flash sequence. 
specify the number of minutes remaining until the first flash of a sequence 
occurs.  
The f i r s t  12 bits in each word 
Thus, the present memory s tores  708 bits of f lash time data. 
The above resul t  leads to the possibility of encoding the flash t ime 
and other data so  a s  to  reduce the total number of bits in the memory, with 
possible consequent reduction in the total number of memory subsystem 
parts .  Such a reduction might increase reliability. 
a.  Fo r  mat C hang e s 
The following format changes, which do not substantially 
a l te r  the functional capability of the memory, were considered: 
(1)  Flash Time Data 
A simple way to approach the ideal minimum num- 
be r  of flash t ime bits would be to  let each flash t ime portion of a flash t ime 
word represent the number of minutes f rom the preceding flash time. Fo r  
random f lash t imes,  this interval would be greater than 128 minutes in only 
about 0.6 percent of the cases .  The number of flash time bits in each flash 
t ime word could be limited to seven. 
would be 7 x 59 = 413. 
The total number of flash time bits 
(2) Light  Selection Data 
The present system uses  four bits in each flash t ime 
word to specify the lamp bank complement. 
bits per word to specify any one of four intensity levels, while four bits at  
the end of the format  could specify the particular lamps to be used in each 
injection period. 
This could be reduced to two 
( 3 )  Normalizer Data 
The normalizer data presently occupies four bits 
per  flash time word plus 20  bits in word 60 for a total of 256 bits. 
bits represent the equivalent of an 8-bit decimal number, which is the pulse 
These 
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frequency to be subtracted f rom the clock frequency to provide correction. 
The number could either be encoded in standard binary f o r m  with about 27 
bits placed a t  the end of the format, o r  stored in a separate regis ter .  
bits could be gated with the bits of a binary counter to yield the correction 
pulse train.  
The 
An additional bit in each flash t ime word is  used to specify a 5 or 7 
flash sequence. 
623. 
2 x 5 x 7 x 9 = 630 bits, which is a substantial reduction f rom the present 
1, 365 bits. 
place the present 3 by 7 and 5 by 1 3  matrices .  
Thus the total bit requirement is 413 t 124 t 27 t 59 = 
The next convenient s ize  for  relatively pr ime diagonal scanning i s  I 
Thus, the 2 by 5 and 7 by 9 coincidence switch matr ices  r e -  
The object of the above format  changes is to decrease the number 
of par ts  in the memory subsystem. 
f rom 1,365 to 630 cores.  
cuits would be reduced f rom 270 t o  229 parts.  
trophic failure for these circuits is principally determined by the number 
of t rans is tors  and diodes. 
diodes f rom 28 to 23. 
The memory plane would be reduced 
The number of parts in the memory driver c i r -  
However, the ra te  of catas- 
Transis tors  would be reduced f rom 35 to 32, and 
These parts reductions a r e  the resul t  of the elimination of redundant 
data f r o m  the present format. 
bits would cause all the succeeding flash t imes in the injection to  be in e r ro r .  
To reduce the probability of a serious e r r o r  to 0.1 would require a bit e r r o r  
r a t e  on the order  of 10 
gent requirement on the bit e r r o r  ra te .  
An e r r o r  in any of the modified flash t ime 
-3 per bit. The format changes place a more s t r in-  
b. Required Modifications of the Timing Control Logic 
The above format changes for the memory proper require 
considerable modification of the timing control logic of the memory and con- 
t r o l  unit. This modification involves the following changes : 
(1)  The change in memory size f r o m  1, 365 bits to 630 
bits requires a memory clock rate of 10.5 cps rather than 22.75 cps. 
o rde r  to generate this rate,  a modification to the timing circuit configura- 
tion is required. 
configuration has been devised which would result  in the generation of 
the 10.5 cps memory clock signal and the 186.875 cps signal to the 
In 
This problem has been investigated, and no convenient 
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Doppler system, while using the 4.99975 mc  clock input and maintaining 
the accuracy of the present  system. 
tion can be devised which does not increase the timing par ts  count by a 
significant amount; however, in light of the conclusions based on the for- 
mat Changes, it was decided that the amount of effort required to  devise 
such a configuration was not warranted. 
It is assumed that such a configura- 
(2)  Under the discussed memory format, each word 
used for timing counts the minutes since the previous flash sequence 
ra ther  than the time f rom the s t a r t  until a given flash sequence. 
memory control c i rcui t ry  must therefore be modified. 
ification involves the addition of four integrated circuit  modules. 
The 
A possible mod- 
(3) The use of two bits pe r  word, rather than four, 
for f lash tube select  indication requires that certain flash tube select  
data be encoded in  several  words at the end of the memory and that the 
control circuitry be changed. These changes require the addition of 14 
integrated circuit  modules. 
(4) By removing the normalization function from the 
memory, the format change requires that this function be handled by 
special equipment. 
grated circuit  modules. 
This equipment consists of approximately 7 2  inte- 
(5) As a result of the format changes, several  log- 
This results in the elimination ical  functions a r e  no longer necessary. 
of 12 integrated circuits. 
c. N e t  Effect of Format Changes 
The three format changes discussed above result  in  a 
reduction of 1,365 to 630 cores in  the memory plane, a s  well a s  a reduc- 
tion of 41 par ts  in the memory drivers.  
integrated circuits would be required for  the timing control logic. 
is about a 40 percent increase over the number of integrated circuits 
presently used in the memory and control unit. 
added integrated circuits a r e  required to perform the normalization 
function which represented 20 percent of the size of the original memory. 
However, a net increase of 7 8  
This 
About 80 percent of the 
In conclusion, in  view of the more  stringent requirements on the 
bit e r r o r  ra te  and the increase i n  the required number of integrated 
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circuits and the small  reduction in memory dr iver  circuit  cr i t ical  par ts ,  
the three format  changes discusses above do not, f rom a reliability point 
of view, appear to be an improvement over the present design for the 
present set  of functional requirements. As par t  of a continuing effort 
in the a rea  of clock and memory reliability improvement, a further study 
wi l l  be  made to determine the degree to which the functional requirements 
can be relaxed within the framework of the GEOS A and B mission require- 
ments. 
ability for the GEOS B spacecraft  w i l l  be  evaluated. 
wi l l  be  initiated to evaluate the improvement in reliability provided by allow 
ing for switchable redundancy of the individual units (6, 7, 8 )  in Exhibit 3.  
The effects of this relaxation on clock and memory design and rel i -  
In addition, studies 
B. Review of the Applied Physics Laboratory P a r t s  P rogram 
a s  Applied to the Clock and Memory Subsystem 
This section presents the results of a review of the electronic parts 
program used by the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) for the GEOS A 
clock and memory subsystem. 
clock divider, memory, and memory control. 
Assemblies covered in the review were the 
The principal investigating organization for this study was Reliability 
Research and Technology, Inc. (RRT), a subsidiary of Planning Research 
Corporation. Following completion of the RRT effort, P R C  conducted a 
sample review of the APL control drawings (par ts  procurement specifica- 
tions) a t  APL to verify the principal comments made by RRT. 
1. RRT Investigation 
Information was derived from evaluation of APL parts l is ts ,  
PRC/APL parts  program discussion notes, and direct  interviews with 
cognizant personnel a t  APL. The APL control drawings, which present 
the detailed procurement specifications for the GEOS A parts,  were not 
made available to PRC or  RRT by APL at the t ime that this investigation 
was being car r ied  out. 
cus sed in the following subsections. 
The findings of this investigation by RRT a r e  dis-  
a .  Pa r t s  Selection and Application 
Designers received parts selection guidance f r o m  the 
APL electronic par ts  index (sections 3000, 5000, 5200, and 5300). These 
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lists contain a tabulation of electronic parts which a r e  covered by APL 
specifications. As discussed in a subsequent section, some of the i tems 
on the list a r e  not state- of- the- a r t  high reliability par ts .  APL indicated 
a reluctance to use the Established Reliability and MIL- 38100 high relia- 
bility space par ts  because they did not have experience with the specific 
i tems and sources.  
were not available in the ear ly  design phases. 
s t r e s s  c r i te r ia  were left up to  the designer. 
worst  case,  o r  drift/tolerance analyses were performed. No uniform 
derating cr i ter ia  were established for design. 
They further stated that many of the specifications 
Part application and 
No independent s t ress ,  
b.  Part Procurement Specification and 
Procurement Practices 
The available parts l ists  indicate that 20  of 31 par t  
types a r e  covered by APL procurement specifications. 
that the other 11 par t  types a r e  covered by vendors' specifications. APL 
procurement specifications a r e  in the form of control drawings and, in 
general, provide requirements supplemental to a vendor or military 
specification. 
APL, except through a change notice provision in the APL specification. 
Since APL had not made the control drawings available for review a t  the 
t ime of this evaluation, the adequacy and technical accuracy could not 
be  verified. 
It is assumed 
Some of the parameters a r e  therefore not controlled by 
The procurement philosophy of APL leans heavily upon 100 percent 
screening and conditioning such as burn-in and thermal cycling. 
vendors a r e  permitted to establish the screening tes t  requirements aiid 
rejection limits subject to APL review and approval. 
formed by the par ts  manufacturer. 
the monitoring of screening tests o r  the evaluation of test  data. 
data is received, but is  reviewed only after problems develop, 
mer i ca l  analysis is  performed t o  establish patterns or  trends and 
identify departures f rom the norm. 
The 
The tests a r e  per- 
No consistent approach i s  applied to 
Most 
No nu- 
I 
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C.  Usage Profile 
Exhibit 4 presents a usage tabulation derived f romthe  
par ts  lists. 
teresting to  note that a l l  par ts  in  the clock divider a r e  used in the mem- 
ory and memory control. 
types and three integrated circuit  types may be marginal for 1,141- 
pa r t  assembly (i.e.,  the active element usage possibly should be l e s s ) ;  
however, further circuit  analysis w i l l  b e  necessary to substantiate this 
statement. Such an  analysis w i l l  be car r ied  out for the GEOS B design. 
A reasonable standardization effort is indicated. It is in- 
The active element usage of six t ransis tor  
A rating column is integral to the tabulation, but was not completed 
The since the procurement specifications were not available for review. 
rating index of 1 to 5 is  typically used in such tabulations and i ts  defini- 
tion i s  shown in the lower left hand corner .  
A brief evaluation was made of res i s tor  and capacitor selection. 
Examples of the resul ts  of this review a r e  given below. 
regarding APL control drawings is the result  of a sample review con- 
ducted by PRC with the authorization of APL. 
The information 
1 Item 
Resis tor  
Resis tor  
MMF- T- 2 
DM- 10 
Resistor 
MEA and MEB 
t 
Resis tor  DEB 
Tr immer  
Spectrol 50 
Comment 
Has been redesignated MMC and is controlled under 
International Resistor Corporation's "PAR" program. 
MIL-R- 10509 Deposited Carbon. The vendor recom- 
mends replacement with a type CEA controlled relia- 
bility part. 
where their schedule permits.  
The ~ e n r l n r  ecommends replacement with controlled 
reliability part  type CAA, level 2, and type CCB, iev- 
el  2, respectively. APL requires that these res i s tors  
conform to all the applicable requirements of Interna- 
tional Resistor Corporation Established Reliability 
Specification 345, " PAR" program, reliability level 4. 
APL control drawing CD-3016 covers these par t s .  
Cannot identify . 
7 Ooc part, considered marginal for flight application. 
This par t  type is covered by APL control drawing CD- 
3021. 
1.0 watt t o  5 0  C per  MIL-R-27208. 
req8irement is for l inear derating to zero power a t  
150 C. 
APL has been buying type CMR-HRDM 
As per,this specification, the power raiing is 
Above 50 C the 
EXHIBIT 4 - PARTS USAGE TABULATION 
Manufacturers 
P a r t  Numbers 
EM-101-1Gl 
EMI-141-101 
CR 89-90 
MC80 
NPO 
350D 
137D 
IN746-IN759, 
IN9 57A -IN992A 
MMG l l U l  
Electronic 
Memories Inc, 
Electronic 
RP 
IN( 
I Memories Inc. 
Capacitor. I Aerovox Corn. 
Fixed Ceramic 
Capacitor, 
Fixed Ceramic 
Capacitor. 
Fixed Ceramic 
Capacitor, Fixed 
Tantalum 
Capacitor, Fixed 
Tantalum 
Diode. Zener 
Diode 
- - r -  
Aerovox Corp. 
Aerovox Corp. 
Sprague 
Electric Co. 
Sprague 
Electric Co. 
Hoffman 
Micro beml- 
Conductor 
Corp. 
Raytheon 
Fairchild 
Hoffman I Diode Diode Diode 
nductor , 
Fixed R F  
iolid Circuit 
(Integrated) 
b l id  Circuit 
(Integrated) 
iolid Circuit 
(Integrated) 
iensitor 
?ram is tor 
rransistor 
:ransistor Si, 
Filter, By Pass ,  
'400-4245CPS 
Essex  Div. 
Nytronics. Inc. 
Essex  Div. 
Fairchild 
Fairchild 
Fairchild 
Texas 
Instrument 
Fairchild 
Fairchild 
Fairchild 
Resistor Fixed 
Metal Film 
Resistor Fixed 
Metal Film 
ance Cont. 
Int'l Resist- 
ance Cont. 
Int'l Resist-  
ance Cont. 
Resistor,  
I 1 
Rating Index 
1 High Reliability 
2 Controlled Production test  
3 Military Specification 
4 Commercial Limited Control 
5 Commercial No-Control 
Spectrol Elec- 
APLI 
JHU CD 
3003 ~ 
3004 
3005 
3000 
3043 
~ 
5006 
5001 
5002 
5005 
5311 
3006 
3013 
5310 
5214 
525; 
5222 
5223 
3016 
3038 
3021 
IN3730(RD 750) 
IN3064 
IN702A-IN759. 
DECI -DUC TOR 7 
9193051 
9193251 
TI- TM -V8 -56r 
2N3117 
ZN2369A 
S-4855 (Spec. 
2N2297) 
i i < i 9 i O - i  
2NZ90 5A. 
2N2907A 
2N2219, 2N2222 
DM-10 
MEA, MEB. 
DEB 
CCM 
rIzt Total 
Q PRC R-760 23 
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APL Drawing Numbers 
1 Clock Divider 
3 
9 9 10 l b  
3 1  
3 10 7 5 I1 
50 70 
2 I 
j-+ 
23 29  
5 9  
4 
38 
39 
6 
36 
28 
72 171 
152 
6 
89 1,141 
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Capacitor 350D 
Capacitor 137D 
Capacitor 
CR 89-90 
C a pac it o r 
MC 80 
High reliability solid tantalum. 
Can be  replaced with a high reliability version 
type 337D. 
control drawing CD-3043. APL has stated that 
they had originally intended to buy 337D, but 
this type capacitor was not commercially avail- 
able in time. 
Commercial part  not recommended for flight usage. 
The vendor recommends controlled reliability part. 
This part  type i s  covered by APL control drawing CD- 
3003, which specifies a high reliability part. 
Commercial  part has  low temperature solder. 
HMC 80 is  recommended. Jet  Propulsion Labor- 
atory has a high reliability specification on this part. 
This part  type is  covered by APL control drawing 
CD-3003, which specifies a high reliability part .  
This part type is covered by APL 
2. PRC Investigation 
In view of the results of the investigation performed by Reli- 
ability Research and Technology as given above, PRC attempted to verify 
whether the comments presented above were applicable or  whether the 
lack of availability of the control drawings for review had resulted in 
some incorrect  parts evaluations. 
the control drawings on their premises.  
drawings specify high reliability p a r t s .  
PRC studied CD- 3004, Capacitor, Fixed Hi- K C z r a z - i c  Round, Molded 
(MC 80). 
manufactured on an established high- reliability line which has all  the 
necessary in-process controls to insure an output of high reliability capac- 
itors." 
moisture resistance,  and 1,000-hour life tes t  at twice rated voltage and 
125OC a r e  a lso required. 
liability version of MC 80. References 12 and 13 indicate that corrections 
have been made by the manufacturer which eliminate problems (related to 
two failures in  S- 52 spacecraft)  encountered with this capacitor. 
ence 12 ,  an APL memorandum, specifies that for space applications, 
APL agreed to a sample review of 
APL feels that all  their control 
As par t  of the sample review, 
Section IV of this specification states,  "These units shall be 
Sampling tes ts  covering the voltage-temperature characteristic, 
APL considers CD-3004 to specify the high r e -  
Refer- 
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purchases of this component should be restr ic ted to  the high reliability 
vers ion specified in  CD-3004. A review of CD-3003, which covers the 
CR 89-90, indicates that APL has called for a high reliability version 
and has used wording similar to  CD-3004. 
Thus the limited sampling review of the control drawings car r ied  
out by PRC personnel at APL indicates that the control drawings reviewed 
call for high reliability par ts .  It should be recalled that the par ts  l is ts  for 
the clock and memory  subsystem indicate that 20 of 31 pa r t  types a r e  cov- 
e red  by APL control drawings. PRC has confirmed that the balance of 
the pa r t  types a r e  covered by vendors' specifications. 
chased to commercial  specifications only when the high reliability counter- 
par t  is not commercially available in time. 
in-house screening to  increase the effective par t  reliability. 
P a r t s  a r e  pur- 
APL then relies on intensive 
3. Re commendations 
It is recommended that the par ts  program review be contin- 
ued and include the following i tems to be accomplished by APL with PRC 
review or  assistance. 
a.  Application Re view 
A thorough assessment of application s t r e s s  (electrical 
and environmental) and performance of worst  case analysis on cri t ical  o r  
marginal  circuits.  
bility or' further reduction in par t  types. 
Application review should also consider the possi- 
b. Selection Review 
Analysis of existing parts to determine possible direct  
substitution of par t s  with superior controlled reliability characterist ics.  
C.  Screening Test Monitoring and Data Analysis 
Sample monitoring of source screening tes t  performance 
and tes t  data. 
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C. Overall  Conclusions of the Clock and Memory Reliability 
Improvement Study 
A review of the clock and memory subsystem based on the present  
functional requirements has indicated that the present design i s  gener- 
ally a good design f rom a reliability viewpoint. 
improvement could possibly be gained by providing for switchable redun- 
dancy among the clock divider, memory, and memory control units. 
Other format changes, which correspond to  reduced functional require- 
ments,  could possibly result  in an improvement in reliability. Further  
study for GEOS B in these two reliability improvement a r e a s  is planned. 
Significant reliability 
A review of the APL parts  program for the clock and memory 
reveals that there  a r e  many a r e a s  wherein the par ts  program could be 
systematically improved. 
PRC R-760 
27 
V. GEOS 
A. Introduction 
A SYSTEM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The objective of this section is to  integrate the individual a s ses s -  
ments into an overall assessment  of the basic spacecraft  and experi- 
ments. 
model during the GEOS A study was limited, this analysis wil l ,  of neces- 
sity, be somewhat qualitative. 
f i rmly  in mind, however, the results should be indicative of the overall 
reliability of GEOS A. 
Because the t ime available for the development of a system 
If the limitations on the model a r e  kept 
The model to be used for the system may perhaps best  be intro- 
duced by reference to Exhibit 5 and by a brief summary of the pertinent 
previous analyses . 
An analysis has been made, in varying detail, of all the a reas  rep-  
resented by the blocks in Exhibit 5 except for  the Doppler, Range and 
Range Rate transponder, and SECOR transponder experiments. 
The first block represents those i tems not requiring extended active 
operation, such a s  the attitude control subsystem, thermal control, basic 
s t ructures ,  l aser  beam reflectors, etc. It i s  the conclusion of the PRC 
assessment  team that this block contributes no significant propensity to 
system failure o r  degradation of total experiment information, given a 
succes sfui iaunch. 
The command subsystem analysis (Reference 1) showed ihat a v e r y  
l a rge  number of subsystem states (256) were possible. 
each of these s ta tes  could result in a number of different effects on the 
satellite in t e r m s  of loss of function of the experiments. For  example, 
one of the 256 states may be described as  "loss of one row (or  column) 
f r o m  the command matrix. 'I 
effects on the function of the experiments, depending on which row (o r  
column) is lost. However, with a minimum amount of manipulation of 
the command subsystem assessment, it can be determined that the prob- 
ability of loss  of no experiment functions whatever, due to failures in 
Furthermore,  
This single s ta te  may have 16 different 
I 
I 
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the command subsystem, is approximately 0.70. Since this is only 
about 10 percent lower than the F. 0. M. for the subsystem, it 
will be conservatively assumed that the degraded states for this sub- 
system have zero  probability. As a consequence of this assumption, 
it may be stated that the command subsystem causes no degradation 
with probability 0.70 and that it is completely lost  t o  the satellite with 
probability 0.30, both probabilities being appropriate for 1 year ' s  
operation. 
That portion of the telemetry subsystem having a direct  bear- 
Therefore de- ing on experiment information output is quite small. 
graded states,  although highly likely in this subsystem (F. 0. M. = 0.54, 
Reference l l ) ,  should have little direct effect on the value of the experi- 
ments. 
assessment  (Reference 10). F o r  the purpose of this assessment ,  only 
the direct  effect will be considered and the reliability will be set  equal 
to  one. 
This indirect effect is  treated in the operational reliability 
The reliability F. 0. M. for the clock and memory is r e -  
ported in Section 11. G of this report. 
0.838V, where V i s  the relative value of the AOL. 
The minimum value is  0.081 t 
The probability of each of the power supply outputs is  given in 
Reference 9.  The reliabilities, pertinent to this assessment ,  a r e  given 
below. 
Unit -
Optical Beacon Power Supply 
Main Battery 
Transponder Power Supply 
Unit Reliability 
O.?O? 
0.932 
0.907 
B. System Model 
Before proceeding to  a consideration of the experiments proper, 
an  explicit formulation of the system model will be undertaken. The 
usual P R C  approach is to consider all  possible system states Si (de- 
fined by various combinations of operable and inoperable components), 
determine the state probabilities P(Si) , assign a value to each state 
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V(Si) , and finally to derive a system F. 0. M.,  as 
2n 
F.O.M. = P(S.) V(S.) 
i 
where n = the total number of system components 
1 1 
Under certain conditions this approach may be simplified consid- 
In the present  case, for example, it has  been assumed that the erably. 
value of GEOS A is accrued solely from the four experiments (shown in 
Exhibit 5) in  an additive manner with relative weights as follows: Optical 
Beacon 5, Doppler 4, Range and Range Rate transponder 1, SECOR 
transponder 2.  Under the further assumption of independence of fail- 
u re s  between components, it may be demonstrated that 
F.O.M. = C R . V  
J j  
j 
where R = the probability that the jth experiment is  operable (or  in 
j 
a particular degraded s ta te)  
V.  = the normalized relative value of the jth experiment (or a 
3 
particular degraded state thereof) 
and the summation is over all experiments (or  a l l  experiment 
s ta tes)  
With the above assumptions, equation ( 2 )  is true a t  least  as long a s  each 
satellite component is a 2-state device, i. e . ,  either operates o r  fails. 
This condition can nearly always be satisfied by suitable definitions of 
components and is clearly satisfied in the present case, assuming the 
experiments themselves a r e  2-state devices. . 
F o r  satisfactory operation of the optical beacon and the t rans-  
ponders, the corresponding power supply batteries must be in the un- 
failed state. 
main battery in the completely failed state provided the spacecraft is 
The Doppler can operate on the main solar cells with the 
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not in eclipse. Therefore all of the experiments a r e  either potentially 
operable o r  inoperable (depending on the state of the experiment pack- 
age), except for Doppler, which is either completely operable o r  de- 
graded depending solely on the operability o r  nonoperability of the main 
power supply battery (see Reference 9). 
in eclipse the Doppler is always assumed to be operable. 
ellite is eclipsed, the Doppler is operable only i f  the main battery is 
operable. 
is approximately 20 percent. 
explicitly a s  
That is, i f  the satellite is not 
When the sat- 
The proportion of the GEOS A mission that will be eclipsed 
Thus equation ( 2 )  may be written more  
5 
F.O.M. = R.V 
J J  
j = l  
(3) 
' where the various t e rms  a r e  defined in Exhibit 6. 
Utilizing the subsystem reliability numerics derived thus far and Ex- 
hibit 6, 
F. O.M. = 0.265(0.081 + 0.838V) t 0.229r6 t 0.053r7 t 0.106r8 (4) 
where V is the relative value of the alternate optical logic 
r is the 1-year reliability of the numbered units of Exhibit 6 i 
An estimate of the relative 1 -year utility (effectivelnress F- 0. M. ) 
of the basic spacecraft design may be inferred by letting the experiment 
package reliabilities (ri in  equation (4)) approach unity. 
Fo r  V = 0; F.O.M. = 0.41 
For  V = 1; F.O.M. = 0.63 
Unfortunately, without numerical values for V , r6 , r 7  , and 
or a t  least  a means of deriving them, a single numerical F. 0. M. r8 ' 
fo r  the total GEOS satellite cannot be determined. 
a r e  uniformly assumed to be, first zero; then, one-half; and finally, 
unity, F.O.M. goes from 0.02 to 0.33 to 0.63. 
If all four unknowns 
I .  
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EXHIBIT 6 - DEFINITION O F  TERMS FOR GEOS A FIGURE-OF-MERIT 
MODEL EQUATION 
Experiment Probability Value 
j 
V 
1 Optical Beacon Operable r r r  5/12 
2 Doppler Operable r r r  4/12 
3 Doppler Degraded r r (1-rl)  3.2112 
4 Range and Range Rate 
Operable 
j 
State j Definition R 
2 4 5  
1 4 6  
4 6  
r r r  1/12 3 4 7  
3 4 8  
5 SECOR Operable r r r  2 / 1 2  
The ri refer  to the reliability of the spacecraft units under 
consideration as follows: 
i 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
- 
6 
7 
8 
1 - Y e a r  Reliability, 
Units ri 
Main Battery 0.932 
Optical Beacon Power Supply 0.907 
Transponder Power Supply 0.907 
Command Subsystem 0.700 
Optical Beacon Experiment Package and Clock 
and Memory 
Doppler Experiment Package r 6  
7 Range and Range Rate Experiment Package 
SECOR Experiment Package r8  
0.08i t 0.83S.r 
r 
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The basic conclusion to be drawn f rom this analysis of the overall  
GEOS A spacecraft  reliability is that, in order  for the spacecraft to per -  
f o r m  its mission with a reasonable probability of success,  it will be nec- 
e s sa ry  that a major  portion of the mission objectives with respect to the 
optical beacon experiment be accomplished by the use of the alternate 
optical logic and that each of the Doppler, SECOR, and Range and Range 
Rate experiments have a high reliability, that i s ,  close to 1 for a 1-year 
period. 
gible so as to approach zero, and the Doppler, SECOR, and Range and 
Range Rate experiments have a high 1 -year reliability, then the F. 0. M. 
is  approximately 0.41 , which may be interpreted as meaning that, at 
the end of 1 year ,  41 percent of the mission value will be accumulated. 
Of course,  should the above three experiments have a very low reliability 
in  addition to the relative value of the alternate optical logic being 
negligible, the overall  mission F. 0. M. has  been shown above to 
approach zero. 
Should the relative value of the alternate optical logic be negli- 
It should be reiterated that the above F. 0. M. computations reflect 
the use  of the failure ra tes  which a r e  presented in Reference 6, and 
which a r e  based pr imari ly  on MIL Handbook 217. 
s t ra ted in  the Tels tar  program that a carefully designed and implemented 
pa r t s  program can result  in  failure ra te  reduction of the order  of a factor 
of 100. 
by Reliability Research and Technology, Inc. , has shown that reductions 
in  the MIL Handbook 217 failure ra te  cannot be justified without complet- 
ing a detailed review of the APL procurement specifications (control 
drawings). 
It has been demon- 
The review of the par t s  program for the memory, car r ied  out 
The following means a r e  available for improving the overall GEOS 
sys tem F. 0. M. They are :  
1. Improve the reliability of individual subsystems and experi- 
ments. 
memory subsystem, (b) the command subsystem, and (c) the optical 
beacon experiment package. 
Possible candidates for improvement a r e  (a) the clock and 
2. Improve the par t s  program for the entire satellite so as to 
justify the use  of failure ra tes  lower than those specified in Reference 6. 
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3 .  Improve the operational aspects of GEOS by a more nearly 
optimum allocation of telemetry points to  telemetry channels and com- 
mands to the command matr ix  (and thus r a i se  the reliability of the com- 
mand subsystem) and by continuing to delineate the appropriate command 
responses to indications of satellite malfunctions. 
studies presented in  Reference 10 is planned a s  par t  of a follow-on 
effort. 
A continuation of the 
t 
4. It may be practical  in future work to accurately reflect  ex- 
periment value a s  a function of time. 
beacon experiment value i s  accumulated a t  the time the short a r c  meas-  
urements  a r e  taken, thus forming a basis for intercalibration of the 
various geopositioning techniques. Since the short  a r c  measurements 
probably will take place well before the end of the f i r s t  year of opera- 
tion, the expression of experiment value a s  a time function will prob- 
ably have the effect of raising the 1-year GEOS F. 0. M. 
A significant portion of the optical 
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VI. COMMENTS ON GEOS A RELIABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
It must be pointed out that the reliability assessments  car r ied  out 
on GEOS A a r e  based on the design as reflected in the schematic draw- 
ings furnished to PRC by APL primarily during March, April, and May 
of 1965. The assessments ,  then, do not reflect the subsequent revisions. 
They do generally reflect  the A P L p a r t s  program; the review of the par t s  
program, however, was limited to the clock and memory subsystem. 
The entire spacecraft par t s  program is scheduled for review. 
The assessment  does not reflect any of the results f rom the 
qualification and acceptance testing programs car r ied  out at APL. 
In general, the data was not available in time. It is  recommended 
that a task to incorporate qualification, acceptance, and other tes t  
resul ts  into the reliability predictions be approved as a follow-on 
effort. 
would be factored into the predictions obtained f rom reliability models 
by using Bayesian statist ical  techniques. 
In such a task,  the reliability estimates derived f rom tes t s  
Finally, the reliability assessments assume that quality control 
is  perfect  and that, i f  any fabrication e r r o r s  a r i se ,  they a r e  detected 
by quality control inspectors and instrumentation. 
I 
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VU. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It i s  recommended that the following studies be carr ied out a s  
par t  of a continuing reliability assessment  effort on the GEOS 
spacecraft  . 
1 .  Assignment of the command functions to the command 
matr ix  intersections in such a way a s  to optimize the effectiveness 
F. 0. M. 
for the command system. 
The objective here  i s  to achieve a higher effective reliability 
2. Provision for an optimum assignment of telemetry points 
to telemetry channels. 
of degraded telemetry and will provide for maximum utility of the 
spacecraft  within the framework of the mission objectives. 
plication of decision theory i s  contemplated. 
The study wil l  be based on the general case 
The ap- 
3. 
4. 
Complete review of the APL parts  program. 
Continued study of means of improving the design of the 
clock and memory f rom a reliability viewpoint. 
switchable redundancy among the clock divider, memory, and mem- 
o ry  control units, a s  well a s  the effect of reduced functional r e -  
quirements on reliability, should be evaluated. 
The provision for  
It i s  recommended that a certain design modification to the opti- 
c a l  beacon designated a s  Modification 3 be given serious consideration 
for implementation. This modification provides fsr (a) the increased 
use of internal redundancy within the sequence controller, and (b) an 
additional power relay in ser ies  with each of the power relays in each 
f lash assembly. 
of Reference 8. 
Details of this modification a r e  presented on page 6 
The effect of Modification 3 i s  to increase the reliability f rom 
0.843 to 0.946. 
in the optical beacon i s  to prevent continuous flashing by ground com- 
mand, the value of this function should be estimated so that a decision, 
based on the reliability assessment  of Reference 8, can be made a s  to 
whether this function should be retained. 
Further ,  since the only likely use of the 10-flash limit 
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ERRATA SHEET 
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOS A SPACECRAFT 
/ 
PRC R-760 
1. Page iii, line 7 - Change 0.63 to  0.59. 
2. Page 9 ,  line 4 - Change 0.47V to  0.49V. 
3. Page 31, equation (4) - Change 0.265 to 0.222. 
4. Page 31, sixth line f rom bottom - Change 0.63 to 0.59. 
5. Page 31, last line - Change 0.33 to 0.31 and 0.63 to  0.59. 
6 .  Page 32, fourth line from bottom - Change 0.081 + 0.838V to 
0.84(0.081 + 0.838V). 
